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RESUMEN 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar un concepto de solución que asigna a cada 
juego bicooperativo un único vector. En el contexto de los juegos bicooperativos 
introducidos por Bilbao (2000), definimos una solución denominada valor de 
Shapley porque este valor puede interpretarse de una manera semejante al clásico 
valor de Shapley para juegos cooperativos. El resultado más importante del trabajo 
es una caracterización axiomática de este valor. 
 




The aim of the present paper  is to study a one-point solution concept for 
bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a 
one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a 
similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of 
the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. 
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1. Introduction
A cooperative game is deﬁned as a pair (N,v), where N is a ﬁnite set of n players
and v :2 N → R is a function verifying that v(∅)=0 . For each S ∈ 2N, the worth
v(S) can be interpreted as the maximal gain or minimal cost that the players which
form the coalition S can achieve themselves against the best oﬀensive threat by the
complementary coalition N \ S. Classical market games for economies with private
goods are examples of cooperative games.
Now then, if the coalition S is formed, the players of N \ S have not inﬂuence in
the worth of the coalition S? Obviously, the possibility of some elements of N \S can
operate against the actions of the members of the coalition S leads to insuﬃciency of
the classical model. For instance, we consider a group of agents with a common good
which is causing them expenses or costs. In a external or internal way a modiﬁcation
(sale, buying, etc.) of this good is proposed them. This action will suppose a greater
proﬁt to them in case they all agree with the change proposed about the actual
situation of the good. Moreover, even though the patrimonial good can be divisible,
we suppose that the greatest value of the selling operation/modiﬁcation is reached if
we consider all the common good.
These situations may be interpreted in the following manner. We consider pairs
(S,T),w i t hS,T ⊆ N and S ∩ T = ∅. Thus, (S,T) is a partition of the set N of all
players in three groups. Players in S are defenders of modifying the actual situation
and they want to accept a proposal; players in T do not agree with modifying the
situation and they will take action against any change. Finally, the members of
N \ (S ∪ T) are not convinced of the proﬁts derived from the proposal, but they do
not think of objecting and stop the action managed by the elements of coalition S.
From the theory of cooperative games, a possibility of modeling these situations
could be to consider the set of all the ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions, that is,
the set 3N = {(S,T):S,T ⊆ N, S ∩ T = ∅} of all signed coalitions and deﬁne a
function b :3 N → R.F o re a c h(S,T) ∈ 3N, the worth b(S,T) can be interpreted as
the maximal gain (whenever b(S,T) > 0) or minimal loss (whenever b(S,T) < 0)
that the players of the coalition S can achieve when they decide to play together
against the players of T and the players of N \ (S ∪ T) not taking part. This leads
us in a natural way into the concept of bicooperative game introduced by Bilbao [1].
Deﬁnition 1. A bicooperative game is a pair (N,b) with N a ﬁnite set and b is a
function b :3 N → R with b(∅,∅)=0 .
An especial kind of bicooperative games has been studied by Felsenthal and Ma-
chover [5] who consider ternary voting games. This concept is a generalization of
voting games which recognizes abstention as an option alongside yes and no votes.
These games are given by mappings u :3 N → {−1,1} satisfying the following three
conditions: u(N,∅)=1 , u(∅,N)=−1,a n d1(S,T) (i) ≤ 1(S0,T0) (i) for all i ∈ N,
implies u(S,T) ≤ u(S0,T0). A negative outcome, −1, is interpreted as defeat and a
positive outcome, 1, as passage of a bill.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 3
A one-point solution concept for cooperative games is a function which assigns
to every cooperative game a n-dimensional real vector which represents a payoﬀ
distribution over the players. The study of solution concepts is central in cooperative
game theory. The most important solution concept is the Shapley value as proposed
by Shapley [4]. The Shapley value assumes that every player is equally likely to join
to any coalition of the same size and all coalitions with the same size are equally
likely. The Shapley value Φ(v) ∈ Rn of game v is a weighted average of the marginal




s!(n − 1 − s)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)],
where s = |S| and n = |N|.
Another form to introduce the Shapley value is based in the marginal worth
vectors and corresponds to the following interpretation. Suppose the players enter a
room one by one in a randomly chosen order. Each player gets the amount that he
contributes to the coalition S already formed into the room when the player i enters
the room; that is, i gets v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). The Shapley value Φ(v) distributes to















where Πn is the set of all permutations of N and πi is the set of the predecessors of
player i in the order π.
Let us outline the contents of our work. In the next section, we study some
properties and characteristics of the lattice 3N. The aim of the third section is to
introduce the Shapley value for a bicooperative game. We obtain an axiomatization of
the Shapley value in this context as well as a nice formula to compute it. This value is
the only one that satisﬁes our ﬁve axioms. Four of them are extensions of the classical
axioms for the Shapley value: linearity, symmetry, dummy and eﬃciency. The ﬁfth
axiom is refereed to the structure of the family of signed coalitions. Throughout this
paper, we will write S ∪ i and S \ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S \{ i} respectively.
2. The lattice 3N
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set and let 3N = {(A,B):A,B ⊆ N, A∩ B = ∅}.
Grabisch and Labreuche [3] proposed a relation in 3N given by





is a partially ordered set (or poset) with the following properties:
1. (∅,N) is the ﬁrst element: (∅,N) v (A,B) for all (A,B) ∈ 3N.
2. (N,∅) is the last element: (A,B) v (N,∅) for all (A,B) ∈ 3N.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 4
3. Every pair of elements of 3N has a join (A,B) ∨ (C,D)=( A ∪ C,B ∩ D) and




is a ﬁnite distributive
lattice.
Two pairs (A,B) and (C,D) are comparable if (A,B) v (C,D) or (C,D) v
(A,B);otherwise, (A,B) and (C,D) are incomparable. A chain of 3N is an induced





chains have the same number of elements and this number is 2n +1 .T h u s , w e
can consider the rank function ρ :3 N → {0,1,...,2n} such that ρ[(∅,N)] = 0 and
ρ[(S,T)] = ρ[(A,B)]+1 if (S,T) covers (A,B), that is, if (A,B) @ (S,T) and there
no exists (H,J) ∈ 3N such that (A,B) @ (H,J) @ (S,T).
For the distributive lattice 3N,l e tP denote the set of all nonzero ∨-irreducible
elements. Then P is the disjoint union C1 + C2 + ···+ Cn of the chains
Ci = {(∅,N\ i), (i,N \ i)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n = |N|.
An order ideal of P is a subset I of P such that if x ∈ I and y ≤ x,t h e ny ∈ I.
The set of all order ideals of P, ordered by inclusion, is the distributive lattice J(P),
where the lattice operations ∨ and ∧ are just ordinary union and intersection. The
fundamental theorem for ﬁnite distributive lattices (see [6, Theorem 3.4.1]) states
that the map ϕ :3 N → J(P) given by (A,B) 7→ {(X,Y) ∈ P :( X,Y) v (A,B)} is
an isomorphism (see Figure 1).
Example. Let N = {1,2}.T h e nP = {(∅,{1}),(∅,{2}),({2},{1}),({1},{2})} is the
disjoint union of the chains (∅,{1}) @ ({2},{1}) and (∅,{2}) @ ({1},{2}).W ew i l l























































































I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ew i l ld e n o t eb yc
¡
3N¢
the number of maximal chains in 3N and
by c([(A,B),(C,D)]) the number of maximal chains in the sublattice [(A,B),(C,D)].
Proposition 1. The number of maximal chains of 3N is (2n)!/2n,w h e r en = |N|.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 5
Proof. The number of maximal chains of 3N is equal to the number of maximal
chains of J(P) and this number is also equal to the number of extensions e(P) of P
to a total order (see Stanley [6, Section 3.5]).
Since P = C1 + ···+ Cn, where the chain Ci satisﬁes |Ci| =2for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,w e













Proposition 2. For all (A,B) ∈ 3N, the number of maximal chains of the sublattice
[(∅,N),(A,B)] is (n + a − b)!/2a,w h e r ea = |A| and b = |B|.
Proof. It is evident that in the sublattice [(∅,N),(A,B)], there are n−b elements
(∅,N\ i) with i/ ∈ B (see Figure 2).
•
•• · · · · · · • (n − b)















(i1,N\ i1),i 1 ∈ A
(∅,N\ i1)( ∅,N\ i2)( ∅,N\ in−b)
(∅,N)
Fig. 2
Since A ⊆ N \ B,t h e na ≤ n − b and thus, the set of the irreducible elements of
the sublattice can be written as
P[(∅,N),(A,B)] = C1 + ···+ Ca + Ca+1 + ···+ Ca+(n−b−a)
where for all ij ∈ A, 1 ≤ j ≤ a and ia+k / ∈ A ∪ B, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − b − a, we obtain
Cj = {(∅,N\ ij),(ij,N\ ij)},
Ca+k = {(∅,N\ ia+k)}.
That is, there are a chains such that |Cj| =2and there are n−b−a chains such
that |Ca+k| =1 . Since
|C1| + ···+ |Ca| + |Ca+1| + ···+
¯ ¯Ca+(n−b−a)
¯ ¯ =2 a +( n − b − a),THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 6








(n + a − b)!
2a . ¤
Proposition 3. Let (A,B), (C,D) ∈ 3N with (A,B) v (C,D). The number of
maximal chains of the sublattice [(A,B),(C,D)] is equal to the number of maximal
chains of the sublattice [(D,C),(B,A)].
Proof. F i r s to fa l l ,n o t et h a ti f(A,B) v (C,D), then A ⊆ C, B ⊇ D and hence









be the map deﬁned by ϕ(A,B)=( B,A). This map
is one to one since
ϕ(A,B)=ϕ(C,D) ⇐⇒ (B,A)=( D,C) ⇐⇒ B = D, A = C ⇐⇒ (A,B)=( C,D).
Clearly, if
(A,B) @ (A1,B 1) @ ···@ (Ak,B k) @ (C,D)
is a maximal chain in the sublattice [(A,B),(C,D)] then
(D,C) @ (Bk,A k) @ ···@ (B1,A 1) @ (B,A)
is a maximal chain in the sublattice [(D,C),(B,A)]. Finally, it follows that
(X,Y) ∈ [(A,B),(C,D)] ⇐⇒ (Y,X) ∈ [(D,C),(B,A)]. ¤
3. The Shapley value for bicooperative games
We denote by BGN the real vector space of all bicooperative games on N, that is
BGN =
©
b :3 N → R,b (∅,∅)=0
ª
.
We consider the identity games
©





u(S,T) :( S,T) ∈ 3N, (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅)
ª
and the inferior unanimity
games
n
u(S,T) :( S,T) ∈ 3N, (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅)
o
, which are deﬁned, for any (S,T) ∈ 3N
such that (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅) as follows.
The identity game δ(S,T) :3 N → R is deﬁned by
δ(S,T) (A,B)=
½
1 if (A,B)=( S,T),
0 otherwise.
The superior unanimity game u(S,T) :3 N → R is given by
u(S,T) (A,B)=
½
1 if (S,T) v (A,B), (A,B) 6=( ∅,∅),
0 otherwise.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 7
The inferior unanimity game u(S,T) :3 N → R is deﬁned by
u(S,T) (A,B)=
½
−1 if (A,B) v (S,T), (A,B) 6=( ∅,∅),
0 otherwise.
It is easy to prove (see [2]) that all the above collections are bases of BGN.
A value on BGN is a function Φ : BGN → Rn, which associates to each bicoop-
erative game b a vector (Φ1 (b),...,Φn (b)) which represents the ‘a priori’ value that
every player has in the game b. In order to deﬁne a reasonable value for a bicoopera-
tive game and following the same issue and interpretation of the Shapley value in the
cooperative case, we consider that a player i estimates his participation in game b,
evaluating his marginal contributions b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T) in those signed coalitions
(S ∪ i,T) that are formed from others (S,T) when i is incorporated to S and his
marginal contributions b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i) in those (S,T) that are formed when i
leaves the coalition T ∪ i.






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
,
where for every (S,T),t h ec o e ﬃcient pi
(S,T) can be interpreted as the subjective
probability that the player i has of joining the coalition S and pi
(S,T) as the subjective
probability that the player i has of leaving the coalition T ∪i. Thus, Φi (b) is the value
that the player i can expect in the game b.
Figure 3 shows the diﬀerent sequential orders corresponding to the diﬀerent chains
from (∅,N) to (N,∅) which contain (S,T) and (S ∪ i,T) and all chains that contain
the signed coalitions (S,T ∪ i) and (S,T).THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 8
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If we assume that all sequential orders or chains have the same probability, we
can deduce formulas for these probabilities pi
(S,T) and pi
(S,T) in terms of the number
of chains which contain to these coalitions. Applying Propositions 3 and 4, we obtain
pi
(S,T) =
c([(∅,N),(S,T)]) c([(S ∪ i,T),(N,∅)])
c(3N)
=
(n + s − t)!
2s ·










c([(∅,N),(S,T ∪ i)]) c([(S,T)(N,∅)])
c(3N)
=
(n + t − s)!
2t ·





(n + t − s)!(n + s − t − 1)!
(2n)!
2n−s−t.
Taking into account that pi
(S,T) and pi
(S,T) are independent of player i,a n do n l y
depend of s = |S| and t = |T|, we can establish the following deﬁnition.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 9
Deﬁnition 2. The Shapley value for the bicooperative game b ∈ BGN is given, for





ps,t (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + ps,t (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
where, for all (S,T) ∈ 3N\i,
ps,t =





(n + t − s)!(n + s − t − 1)!
(2n)!
2n−s−t.
With the aim to characterize the Shapley value for bicooperative games, we con-
sider a set of reasonable axioms and we prove that the Shapley value is the unique
value on BGN which satisﬁes these axioms.
Linearity axiom. For all α,β ∈ R,a n db,w ∈ BGN,
Φi(αb + βw)=αΦi(b)+βΦi(w).
We now introduce the dummy axiom, understanding that a player is a dummy
player when his contributions to signed coalitions (S ∪ i,T) formed with his incorpo-
ration to S and his contributions to signed coalitions (S,T) formed with his desertion
of T ∪ i coincide exactly with his individual contributions, that is, a player i ∈ N is
a dummy in b ∈ BGN if, for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i, it holds
b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) = b({i},∅),
b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i)=−b(∅,{i}).
Note that if i ∈ N is a dummy in b ∈ BGN then, for all (S,T) ∈ 3N\i,
b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T ∪ i)=b({i},∅) − b(∅,{i}).
Since a dummy player i in a game b has no meaningful strategic role in the game,
the value that this player should expect in the game b must exactly be the sum up
of his contributions.
Dummy axiom.I fp l a y e ri ∈ N is dummy in b ∈ BGN,t h e n
Φi(b)=b({i},∅) − b(∅,{i}).THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 10
In the similar way to the cooperative case, for the comparison of roles in a game to
be meaningful, the evaluation of a particular position should depend on the structure
of the game but not on the labels of the players.
Symmetry axiom. For all b ∈ BGN and for any permutation π deﬁned on N, it
holds that, for all i ∈ N
Φπi(πb)=Φi(b)
where πb(πS,πT)=b(S,T) and πS = {πi : i ∈ S}.
In a cooperative game, it is assumed that all players decide to cooperate among
them and form the grand coalition N. This leads to the problem of distributing
the amount v(N) among them. Taking into account diﬀerent situations that can
be modelled by a bicooperative game b, we suppose that the amount b(N,∅) is the
maximal gain and b(∅,N) is the minimal loss obtained by the players when they
decide full cooperation. Then the maximal global gain is given by b(N,∅)−b(∅,N).
From this perspective, Φ must satisfy the following axiom.




It is easy to check that our Shapley value for bicooperative games veriﬁes the above
axioms. But this value is not the unique value which satisﬁes these four axioms. For




s!(n − s − 1)!
n!
[b(S ∪ i,N \ (S ∪ i)) − b(S,N \ S)],
also veriﬁes these axioms. However, note that, for any bicooperative game b ∈ BGN,
this value is the Shapley value corresponding to the cooperative game (N,v), where
v :2 N → R is deﬁned by v(A)=b(A,N \ A) if A 6= ∅, and v(∅)=0 . This value
is not satisfactory for any bicooperative game in the sense that only consider the
contributions to signed coalitions in which all players take part. Moreover, there is
an inﬁnity of diﬀerent bicooperative games which give rise to the same cooperative
game.
For these reasons, if we want to obtain an axiomatic characterization of our Shap-
ley value for bicooperative games, we need to introduce an additional axiom. Previ-






ps,t (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + ps,t (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
,THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 11
where ps,t and ps,t satisfy some conditions.
We prove this result in several steps. Fir s to fa l l ,w es h o wt h a tav a l u ef o rp l a y e ri
satisfying the linearity and dummy axioms can be expressed as a linear combination
of his contributions.
Theorem 4. Let Φi be a value for player i ∈ N which satisﬁes linearity and dummy






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi







































































(∅,{i})b(∅,{i}).THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 12
Let us consider the games wi
(A,B) :3 N → R where, for each (A,B) ∈ 3N\i, the
game wi




   
   
wi
(A,B) (S \ i,T) if i ∈ S,
wi
(A,B) (S,T \ i) if i ∈ T,
1 if i/ ∈ S ∪ T,(∅,∅) 6=( S,T) v (A,B),
0 otherwise.
Clearly, player i is a dummy in wi
(A,B) for each (A,B) ∈ 3N\i and hence Φi(wi
(A,B))=0











We show, by induction on ρ[(S,T)], the rank of the signed coalitions, that for all
(S,T) ∈ 3N\i, (S,T) 6=( ∅,∅), it holds that ai
(S,T) +ai
(S∪i,T) +ai
(S,T∪i) =0 . Note that

















Now assume the property for (H,J) ∈ 3N\i with ρ[(H,J)] ≤ k −1 and suppose that




























where the last but one equality follows from the induction hypothesis, and the last




























(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 13

































































= u(N\i,{i}) ({i},∅) − u(N\i,{i}) (∅,{i})=1 . ¤
Now, we show that if add the symmetry axiom to the linearity and dummy axioms,
the coeﬃcients pi
(S,T) and pi
(S,T) only depend of the cardinality of S and T.







(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
.
If Φi satisﬁes the symmetry axiom, then pi
(S,T) = ps,t and pi
(S,T) = ps,t for all (S,T) ∈
3N\i with s = |S| and t = |T|.






(S,T) (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + pi
(S,T) (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
Let (S1,T 1) and (S2,T 2) be signed coalitions in 3N\i such that (S1,T 1) 6=( ∅,∅) 6=
(S2,T 2) satisfying that |S1| = |S2| <n− 1 and |T1| = |T2| <n− 1. Consider a
permutation π of N that takes πS1 = S2 and πT1 = T2 while leaving i ﬁxed. Then






(S2,T2),THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 14
where the second equality follows from the symmetry axiom.
Now, let i,j ∈ N,i 6= j and let (S,T) ∈ 3N\{i,j}. Consider the permutation
π of N that interchanges i and j while leaving the remaining players ﬁxed. Then
















Hence, for every (S,T) ∈ 3N\i there exist ps,t and ps,t such that pi
(S,T) = ps,t and
pi
(S,T) = ps,t for all i ∈ N. ¤
The following theorem characterizes the values Φ =( Φ1,...,Φn) which satisfy
the above axioms and are eﬃcient.
Theorem 6. Let Φ =( Φ1,...,Φn) be a value on BGN deﬁned, for every game b and





ps,t (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + ps,t (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i
.









(n − s − t)ps,t + tps,t−1 =( n − s − t)ps,t + sps−1,t
for all 0 ≤ s, t ≤ n − 1 and 0 <s+ t ≤ n − 1.
Proof. For every b ∈ BGN we have that
P
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If the coeﬃcients satisfy the relations for the coeﬃcients, then Φ satisﬁes the
eﬃciency axiom.
Conversely, ﬁx (S,T) ∈ 3N,(S,T) 6=( ∅,∅), and applying the preceding equality







npn−1,0 if (S,T)=( N,∅),
−np0,n−1 if (S,T)=( ∅,N),





Thus, if Φ satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom, the relations for the coeﬃcients are true.
¤
As we have already indicated, these four axioms are not suﬃcient to characterize
the Shapley value for bicooperative games. Now, we introduce an additional axiom
and prove that our Shapley value is the unique value on BGN that veriﬁes the ﬁve
axioms. This new axiom will take into account the structure of the set of the signed
coalitions.
First of all, note that the signed coalitions (S \ j,T) and (S,T ∪ i) where j ∈ S
and i/ ∈ S ∪ T h a v et h es a m er a n k
ρ[(S \ j,T)] = ρ[(S,T ∪ i)] = n + s − t − 1.
However, the number of maximal chains in the sublattice [(∅,N),(S \ j,T)] is not the
same that the number of maximal chains in [(∅,N),(S,T ∪ i)] since, by Proposition
3,
c([(∅,N),(S \ j,T)]) =
(n + s − 1 − t)!
2s−1 ,
c([(∅,N),(S,T ∪ i)]) =
(n + s − t − 1)!
2s .
Hence, beginning from the signed coalition (∅,N), the probability of formation
of the signed coalition (S,T) with the incorporation of one player j to (S \ j,T) must
be distinct to the probability of formation (S,T) with the desertion of one player i
in (S,T ∪ i).
In analogous form, if we consider (S,T \ k) with k ∈ T and (S ∪ i,T) which have
the same rank, the number of maximal chains in [(S,T \ k),(N,∅)] is not equal to
number of maximal chains in [(S ∪ i,T),(N,∅)]. Therefore the probability of forma-
tion of (N,∅) beginning from (S,T \ k) when one player k leaves the coalition T must
be distinct to the probability of formation of (N,∅) when one player i form the signed







(S,T \ k),k∈ T (S ∪ i,T)
(S,T)





















































· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · ·
· · · · ·
Fig. 4
Taking into account these considerations, the values that one player must obtain
in the identity games must be proportional to the number of maximal chains in the
corresponding sublattices. It must be also considered that one value verifying the
above four axioms assigns a non-negative real number to one player i in the identity
game δ(S,T) if this player belongs S and a non-positive real number if the player i
belongs T. From this point of view, our value must be satisﬁed the following axiom
(see Figure 4).

















Theorem 7. Let Φ be a value on BGN. The value Φ is the Shapley value if and
only if Φ satisﬁes the eﬃciency axiom and each component satisﬁes linearity, dummy,
symmetry and structural axioms.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 17






ps,t (b(S ∪ i,T) − b(S,T)) + ps,t (b(S,T) − b(S,T ∪ i))
i









(n − s − t)ps,t + tps,t−1 =( n − s − t)ps,t + sps−1,t. (1)
Taking into account that the value Φ veriﬁes the structural axiom then
ps−1,t =2 ps,t (2)
ps,t−1 =2 ps,t (3)
We prove that these coeﬃcients, verifying all above conditions, are determined in
unique form. Indeed, consider a coalition (S,T) with |S| = n − 1 and |T| =0 . If we
apply the equation (1) to this coalition, we obtain
pn−1,0 = pn−1,0 +( n − 1)pn−2,0
and by (2), pn−2,0 =2 pn−1,0. Taking into account that pn−1,0 = 1
n and combining the
above equalities, we have that
1
n















In similar way, if we apply (1) and (2) to a signed coalition (S,T) with |S| = n−2
and |T| =0 , we get









2n.THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 18
If we assume that
ps+1,0 =
(n − s − 1)!(n + s)!
2s+1 (2n)!
2n, ps,0 =
(n − s − 1)!(n + s)!
2s (2n)!
2n
then, for |S| = s and |T| =0 , applying (1) and (2)
(n − s)ps,0 =( n − s)ps,0 + sps−1,0,
ps−1,0 =2 ps,0,
and combining both expressions, we obtain, for 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1,
ps,0 =
(n − s)!(n + s − 1)!
2s (2n)!
2n, ps−1,0 =
(n − s)!(n + s − 1)!
2s−1 (2n)!
2n.
If we apply the same reasoning with the equalities (1) and (3) beginning with a
coalition (S,T) with |S| =0and |T| = n − 1, we obtain, for 1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1,
p0,t =
(n − t)!(n + t − 1)!
2t (2n)!
2n,p 0,t−1 =
(n − t)!(n + t − 1)!
2t−1 (2n)!
2n.
If we now consider (S,T) with |S| = s and |T| =1 , we apply (1) and (3)








and substitute the values already obtained, then
ps−1,1 =
(n − s +1 ) !( n + s − 2)!
2s (2n)!
2n,p s,1 =
(n − s +1 ) !( n + s − 2)!
2s+1 (2n)!
2n.
If we assume that
ps−1,t−1 =
(n − s + t − 1)!(n + s − t)!
2s+t−2 (2n)!
2n,p s,t−1 =




s,t−1 =2 ps,t (3), we obtain, for all 0 ≤ s, t ≤ n−1 and s+t ≤ n−1,
ps,t =
(n + s − t)!(n + t − s − 1)!
2s+t (2n)!
2n.
Finally, applying (1) and (2)




(n + t − s)!(n + s − t − 1)!
2s+t (2n)!
2n
for all 0 ≤ s, t ≤ n − 1 and s + t ≤ n − 1. ¤THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR BICOOPERATIVE GAMES 19
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